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Abst ract 
The wing on the NASA F-l11 transonic aircraft 
technology airplane was modified to provide flex-
ible leading and trailing edge flaps. This wing 
is known as thE! mission adaptive wing (MA~I) because 
aerodynamic efficiency can be maintained at all 
speeds. Unlike a conventional wing, the MAW has 
no spoilers. e)(ternal flap hinges, or fair'ings to 
break the smooth contour. The leading edge flaps 
and three-segment trailing edge flaps are con-
troll ed by a fI!dundant fly-by-wi re control system 
that features iI dual digital primary system archi-
tecture providing roll and symmetric commands to 
the MAW control surfaces. A segregated analog 
backup system is provided in the event of a pri-
mary !.ystem fa i 1 ure. Thi s paper di scusses the 
design, development, testing, qualification, and 
fl ight test experience of the MAW primary and 
backup fl i ght control systems. 
Nomencl ature 
AFT! advanced fighter technology integration 
AICS ai rborne instrumentation computer system 
ADC ana 1 og-to-di gi ta 1 converter 
CCOU cross.-channel display unit 
CLIN left inboard flap command 
CLLE left leading edge flap command 
CLMIO left midspan flap command 
CLOUT left outboard flap command 
CRIN right inboard flap command 
CRLE right leading edge command 
CRMIO 
CROUT 
right midspan command 
ri ght outboard comma'nd 
CP command processer 
CPU central processing unit 
CRC cyclic redundancy characters 
CST combined sysl;ems test 
OAC digital-to-analog converter 
DOIU digital data interface unit 
EPROM erasable programmable read-only memory 
*Aerospace Engineer. 
FCEU 
FCS 
FMET 
GRBK 
Hi MAT 
INBO 
INTIN 
INTLE 
I'lTMID 
I 'IT OUT 
I/O 
flight control electronics unit 
flight control system 
failure modes and effects testing 
ground roll brake 
highly maneuverable aircraft technology 
inboard fl aps 
inboard flaps integrator command 
leading edge flaps integrator command 
midspan flaps integrator command 
outboard flaps integrator command 
input-output 
KRSTICK roll stick gearing gain 
L'; 1 ead i ng edge 
L!M limiter 
LiDT linear variable differential transducer 
LIm 1 Poft wi n9 down 
MAW ,r:'; ss ion adapti ve wi ng 
MGP fl1anual command program 
P primary hyd raul; c system 
PGM pulse-code modulation 
PIlU ~ower drive unit 
P::O 
PI.IN 
PI.LE 
PI.MID 
Pl.OUT 
PF: IN 
PF:LE 
PRMID 
PROUT 
PTDRIV 
parallel input-output 
left inboard flap position 
left leading edge flap position 
1 eft midspan fl ap position 
1 eft outboard flap position 
right inboard fl ap position 
right 1 eading edge position 
right midspan position 
ri ght outboard position 
preflight test dri ver 
OC 
ROLCOM 
ROM 
R/T 
RWD 
SOLC 
SID 
SOC 
SYMCMO 
impact pressure 
roll command 
read-only memory 
rolling tail 
right wing down 
synchronous data link control 
serial input-output 
synchro-to-digital converter 
symmetric command 
TACT transonic aircraft technology 
TE trailing edge 
U utility hydraulic system 
6P differential hydraulic pressure 
between PDUs of a given surface 
Introduction 
The aerodynamic design of today's high-
performance aircraft is a compromise between con-
flicting requirements. Performance requirements 
are generally formulated for a wide range of oper-
ating conditions; however, a fixed airfoil is 
suitable only for a very limited range of flight 
conditions. One solution to thts problem is the 
use of a variable-camber mission adaptive wing 
(MAW). The airfoil geometry of the MAW can be 
reconfi gured in fl i ght to improve aerodynami c per-
formance throughout the flight envelope. Dramatic 
improvements are predicted in payload range, 
maneuverability, and ride qualities. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) and the U. S. Air Force have estab-
lished a joint advanced fighter technology inte-
gration (AFT!) program to demonstrate the MAW 
technology.1 The Boeing Military Aircraft Company 
was selected to modify the wing on the NASA F-111 
transonic aircraft technology (TACT) research air-
craft to incorporate flexible leading and trailing 
edge flaps. This airplane, known as the AFTI/ 
F-l11 airplane (Fig. I), is being flight tested 
by the NASA Ames Research Center at the Dryden 
Flight Research Facility. This vehicle was chosen 
because it afforded the best opportunity to 
investigate subsonic, transonic, and supersonic 
flight regimes for a wide range of wing sweeps 
(16° to 58°) and maneuvering conditions. 
The MAW features smooth, flexible, fiberglass 
panels for both the leading and trailing edge 
upper flap surfaces, as shown in Fig. 2. The 
lower surface panels form a sliding flush seal 
when the camber is set at the low-speed con-
figuration. The flap drive mechanism is con-
tained within the wing, so the smooth contour is 
not disturbed. The original TACT/F-111 wing box 
is a thin airfoil design; therefore, the internal 
flap drive incorporates rotary actuators, torque 
tubes, gear boxes, and hydraulic motors, as shown 
in Fig. 3. The thickness ratio for the MAW at a 
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16° sweep is 9.7 perce~t at the root and 5.4 per-
cent at the wingtip. 
This paper presents the deSign, development, 
and qualification of the MAW flight control sys-
tems and subsequent flight test experience. 
AFTI/F-111 Airplane Modifications 
It was neccessary to modify the TACT/F-lll 
airplane for the MAW features (Fig. 4), which 
include a single leading edge flap, three-segment 
trailing edge flap, two flight control electro-
nics units (FCEU), interfaces to the original 
electrical and hydraulic systems, interfaces to 
certain original sensors, and new MAW sensors, 
cockpit panel, and battery. Details of the modi-
fications are described in Ref. 2. 
The MAW flight control system (FCS) was added 
to control the MAW leading edge (LE) and trailing 
edge (TE) flaps. This system is isolated from the 
basic F-111 control system that controls the sta-
bilon and rudder so that any problem developing 
from the MAW system wi 11 not affect the basi c ai r-
plane. The MAW FCEUs each consist of a primary 
and a backup FCS and servo drive electronics. The 
primary system features dual-channel digital com·· 
puters. The LE and TE flaps can be trimmed sym-
metrically. Also, the midspan and outboard flaps 
are used as rolling flaps to supplement the sta-
bi10n. The backup system is a dual-channel segre-
gated analog system; it is designed as a "get-home" 
mode and does not have all the functions of the 
primary system. 
Separate primary and backup servo el ectronic!; 
receive a command from whichever system is con-
trolling the flaps (primary or backup). Four 
types of signals can be generated to the valve at 
each power drive unit (PDU): proportional (com-
mands), block, bypass, and brake. Internal servo 
electronics functions include the limiting of sur-
face rate, surface position, and valve current as 
well as failure detection testing. 
MAW Sy stem Ha rdwa re Desc ri pt i on 
The basic MAW flap actuation system consists 
of hydraulic motor, gear reduction box, electric 
brake, rotary actuator. control module, and 
torque tube. The motor, gear box. servo control 
valve, and brake are housed in the compact PDU 
module. The thin airfoil section of the TACT wing 
necessitated this compact arrangement. There are 
two PDUs for each of the eight MAW flaps. 
Primary System 
The primary MAW FCS architecture is shown in 
Fig. 5. The partitioning is structured so that 
each primary channel ideally provides one-half of 
the torque to drive a MAW flap. The numbers at 
each end of the flaps represent a PDU number, and 
P and U indicate primary or utility hydraulic sys-
tem, respectively. Channell and channel 2 com-
mands are w'ired to the PDUs driven by the primary 
and utility hydraulic systems, respectively. 
Both FCEUs receive a dedicated differential pres-
sure (6P) and flap position linear variable dif-
ferential tranducer (LVDT) for each flap. The two 
primary computer servo commands are compared by 
monitoring their ~P torques at opposite ends of 
the same flap. The dP signal is generated by a 
hardware sensor that measures the hydraulic pres-
sure for force fight between the PDUs on a given 
surface. If there is a large force fight, the 
flaps cannot be driven with one channel, and the 
system would downmode to backup. In addition, if 
one of the primary computers should fail, the 
system would donwmode to backup. 
For'ce fi ghts are mi nimi zed by the use of two 
equalization loops: position error and pressure. 
The position error loop provides identical actu-
ating ,error Signals to both servo amplifiers; 
these (~rror si gnal s are introduced by unequa1 
position cOrmlands or unequal position trans-
ducer outputs, or both, within a 2.6° limit. 
The pr(~ssure equalization networks minimize 
the fOI"ce fi ght between the two servo loops that 
arises because of the inherent servo valve driver 
amplifier offsets and the bias offset currents of 
the two servo valves. 
Backup System 
Thl! backup rcs archi tecture is di fferent than 
the primary, as shown in Fig. 6. No control is 
providE!d to the LE flaps from thi $ system, because 
they ar'e automatically braked. Backup system A 
d ri ves both POU5; of the 1 eft mi dspan and ri ght 
outboar'd and thE! inner POUs of the inboard fl aps • 
Backup system B drives both PDUs of the left out-
board ~Ind ri ght mi dspan and the outer POUs of the 
inboard fl aps. The backup system has its own 
dedicat.ed LVDTs.. Note that the roll flaps have 
only one backup LVDT per surface. If a single 
backup channel fail s, the brakes waul d be set for 
those naps, and the remaining backup system would 
continue to drive its dedicated flaps. 
Isolation of Primary and Backup Systems 
The primary and backup hardware components are 
generally isolated from one another. For example, 
a MAW roll stick transducer was added to isol ate 
the MAW roll control from the basic F-Ill FCS rol-
ling tail and to provide independent roll inputs 
to the MAW primary and backup FCS. There are 
six MAW roll stick transducers (two primary and 
four backup). Each backup system receives two 
stick inputs. Input discrete redundancy includes 
four contacts; two of these discretes go to the 
primary system while a different set goes to each 
backup system. 
~AW Flight Control System Description 
The following sections provide a brief descrip-
tion of the cockpit functions, primary FCS block 
diagram, backup FCS functions and downmode logiC, 
and fault monitoring. 
MAW COCkpit Functions 
The pilot interface to the control of the MAW 
fl ap sUI"faces is accompl i shed by the use of a fl ap 
switch. roll stick. control and display panel, 
I'll ng sw(!ep handl.!. and gun tri gger swi tch. The 
MAW control and display panel is shown in Fig .. 7. 
This panel is used in conjunction with the roll 
stick and flap switch to control the various func-
tions of the MAW flaps; the panel also conveys 
status information and flap positions of the MAW 
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system. Many of the lights and meters are color 
coded for quick backup partitioning reference. 
A detailed description of the primary MAW FCS is 
given in Ref. 3. A brief description of some 
of the manual MAW control functions follows. 
SYSTEM swi tch - sel ects primary or backup MAW FCS 
PRI FAILED RESET switch - resets the backup latch, 
which allows entry to the primary FCS 
MAW CAUTION light - flashes for downmodes or prob-
lems in the backup system; can be reset 
QC FAIL light - lights if the impact pressure (QC) 
probes difference becomes too large; the FCS will 
fix the roll gain and TE deflection limits for 
this failure; can be reset if the difference is 
within the tolerance 
FLAPS lights - HALF. FULL. GND ROLL, and FAIREO 
lights indicate the LE and TE flap command 
selection 
BACKUP RESET - various backup fault monitors will 
set these lights; monitors can be reset if the 
fault conditions have cleared 
Brake switches - switches are provided for the LE. 
A. INBD, and B MAW flap pairs for a manual brake 
engagement; manually braking any TE flaps will 
also cause a downmode to the backup system 
MANUAL COMMAND PROGRAM switch - LE and TE fl aps 
can be pOSitioned to preprograrmled positions by 
using the manual cOrmland program (MCP) function; 
used in conjunction with the 12-position selector 
switch 
RATE SELECT switch - allows symmetric slewing at 
three different rates: FAST (5 deg/sec). NORM 
(I deg/sec). and SLOW (O.3 deg/sec) 
ROLL TRIM switch - used to cOrmland aSYlTllletric trim 
for the MAW roll surfaces (midspan and outboard); 
it has a limited authority of ±2° about the sym-
metric command 
TRIM RESET button - removes MAW roll trim 
INBD FAIR button - causes the inboard flaps to 
drive to a position of 1.8° when the sweep lever 
is at the 26° detent and the flap switch is in 
RETRACT 
Slew switches - manual symmetric trim capability 
is provided with the LE, ALL, INBD. MID. and OUTBO 
switches for the LE and TE flaps 
PREFLIGHT TEST switch - a MAW preflight test pro-
gram can be executed only on the ground; this is 
an automated function to test the force fight 
monitors, the LE brake hardware latch, and the 
backup system hardware latch 
Flap switch - a MAW flap switch located on the 
front cockpit panel can command the LE and TE 
flaps to three camber configurations: RETRACT 
(5°/2°), HALF (15°/100). and FULL (200/18°) 
Home command - gun trigger switch on either stick 
is used to command the LE and TE flaps to 0° and 
2°, respectively 
Digital Primary Control System 
The digital primary control system is designed 
to manually trim the LE and TE flaps symmetrically 
and to compensate for the roll control loss 9ue to 
the removal of the spoilers from the TACT wing. 
Figure 8 is a simplified block diagram of the MAW 
control system showing the roll and symmetric com-
mands. Impact pressure (QC) signals from the nose 
boom (QCNOSE) and fuselage side probes (QCSIDE) 
are filtered to reduce noise and then averaged 
(yielding QCAVE) for use in scheduling the roll 
stick gearing gain (KRSTICK). A lead-lag filter 
is used in the stick input path (ROLLSTK) to 
quicken the roll response for the takeoff and land 
configuration. The roll gain (RGAIN) of 1.95 pro-
vides 18.5° of MAW roll authority. 
The roll command (ROLCOM) is derived by sum-
ming the roll command from the stick with the roll 
trim (RWD trim or LWD trim). The MAW trim has a 
±2° limit about the trim point. Trim commands 
are faded out either by pressing the trim reset 
switch (TRIM RES) or whenever the system goes to 
the backup mode. 
Symmetri c commands are' deri ved by i ntegrati ng 
the variou5 ways of commanding symmetric flap 
motion. The symmetric slew discretes are shown 
in order of priority from left to right. The 
manual command program (MCP) has the lowest pri-
ority. the inboard flap fairing command (FAIR) 
has the highest. 
The roll flap servo commands are derived by 
summing ROLCOM with the integrator inputs (INTMID 
and INTOUT). The TE flap deflection limits are 
schedul ed with ~ and are rate 1 imited. The 
midspan and outboard flaps are rate limited at 
40 deg/sec. the inboard flaps at 30 deg/sec, and 
the leading flaps at 10 deg/sec. The primary com-
mands track the positions whenever the system is 
in backup. For a transfer from backup to the pri-
mary system, the commands are faded from the pre-
sent flap position to the new updated primary 
commands in 2 sec. 
Analog Backup Control System 
The backup system can symmetrically position 
the TE flaps in three positions only, and there is 
no trimming capability. There is no control of 
the LE flaps; they are automatically braked. The 
TE flap rate and authority limits are the same as 
those in the primary system. Additional functions 
provided in the backup system are the ability to 
set A, INBD, or B trail ing edge fl ap pai rs. The 
system is partitioned into independent A and B 
.ana10g controllers. This design allows for par-
'tial control after the failure of one of the 
backup channels. Details of the backup FCS are 
described in Ref. 4. 
Transition logic is designed to suppress the 
flap command switching transients when the control 
is transferred from primary to backup. This is 
accomplished by driving first-order filters with 
the current flap positions. An example for a 
single surface is shown in Fig. 9. When control 
is transferred to the backup system, the outputs 
of these filters are switched so that they are 
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connected to the summing junctions to provide the 
init.ia1 flap command. The initial roll command 
(ROLLCMD) and symmetric command (SYMCMD) are zero 
immediately after switching to the backup control. 
They are then faded to their requested values by 
4-sec time-constant filters. 
Fault Monitoring 
Fault checking is performed continuously in 
both the primary and the backup FCS ,so the pi 1 ot 
and ground observers know the health of the total 
MAW FCS. The pilot can reset a backup failure 
monitor while still flying in the primary system. 
If the system downmodes to backup with an existing 
monitor fault. the brakes will be automatically 
set on the faulty system. 
Failure monitoring can be divided into those 
failures originating in either the primary or the 
backup systems. Primary system failures can be 
grouped into two categories: (1) stay in primary 
and (2) downmode to backup. The backup system 
failures can also be grouped into two categories: 
(1) do not set brakes. and (2) set any combination 
of A. S, or INBD brakes. These general failures 
are shown in Table 1. Each type of fault has its 
own distinct fail discrete. These fail flags are 
available in the cross-channel data and are te1e-
metered to the ground station. 
The primary FCS is designed to prevent a MAW 
surface hardover. If a single command disagree-
ment between the two ,channels exists, the fault 
monitor will generate a downmode. The downmode 
could be the result of a software command error 
or an excessive AP. It is conceivable that a 
hardover could be possible while the backup sys-
tem is engaged, but this would require the loss 
of a backup feedback signal in the servo elec-
tronics (that is. a frozen or open backup LVDT). 
However, if the flaps are in RETRACT, fault 
detection testing would cause the brakes to be 
automatically set. The worst-case flap offset 
would be less than 12°. Single and double flap 
runaways have been studied extensively in the 
simulator; they are easily controlled with 
opposite roll stick. 
Flight System Development 
The MAW flight system development progressed 
in several stages. A design was developed that 
satisfied both mission research requirements and 
safety of flight. A dual digital primary and seg-
regated analog backup FCS evolved. The program-
ming task was evaluated, and the Zilog zaooo CPU 
was selected. Future software and hardware expan-
sion was allowed for in the design. Six flight 
computers based on the zaooo CPU were designed and 
built for the AFTI/F-lll. The cross-channel data 
communications utilized a zao chip. Specification 
documents were developed for both the primary 3 and 
the backup systems. 4 
Simulation Development 
A piloted simulation was used extensively to 
develop and assess the MAW control system design. 
The MAW FCS software structure for the simulation 
was programmed in FORTRAN using the flow charts 
found in the software design description docu-
ment. S The information found in Refs. 3 and 4 was 
also used. During this effort some logic errors 
and design deficiencies were discovered and cor-
rected before any flight code was generated. A 
software version for the simulation of the backup 
system was also interfaced with the simulation. 
Fault detection and downmode logic was structured 
tor the simulation to reflect the flight system as 
much as possible. A set of possible failure modes 
was developed for pilot training and assessment of 
the FCS design. The failure input modes for the 
simulation are shown in Table 2. 
The simulation revealed a pilot-induced oscil-
lation tendency in the landing approach. particu-
larly in turbulence and crosswind conditions. A 
lead-lag filter (Fig. a) was added for the power 
approach condition, and the rolling flap rate limit 
had to be increased from 30 to 40 deg/sec to alle-
viate this problem. The roll rate increase was 
accomplished by a linkage change in the flap 
drive mechanism. 
Hardware Acceptance Tests 
The individual hardware components for both 
primary and backup FCEUs were tested in each box 
separately according to the procedures outl ined 
in Ref. 6. Primary system hardware was tested by 
temporarily cross-connecting input-output (I/O) to 
itself. All the discrete converters, analog-to-
digital, digital-to-analog, and synchro-to-digital 
converters (DAC, AOC, and SOC, respectively), were 
tested in this manner. The backup system func-
tions, such as filters, limiters, and gain sched-
ulers, were tested by temporarily connecting to 
the primary I/O. The primary I/O was driven by 
a micr'ocomputer that contai ned the semi automati c 
test programs. The test programs contained oper-
ator and primary FCEU I/O instructions with built 
in pass-fail criteria. Hard copies of the test 
results were obtained for all the FCEUs. 
Flight Software Development 
The flight software code was written in 
assembly language from flow charts that were 
developed from Ref. 3. Figure 10 gives an 
overview of the software structure. 
The two FCEUs are synchronized to assure that 
the difference between the start times of their 
minor cycles is less than 70 ~sec. The two proc-
essors exchange a sync message through the com-
munication channel. The elapsed time between 
sending a sync message and receiving the other 
processor's sync message is measured; since the 
actual transmission time is known, it can be 
determi ned whi ch processor is 1 aggi ng. The faster 
processor adjusts the count in its timer to syn-
chronize with the slower unit. 
The input module commands the hardware AOC 
and SDC to perform their conversion and then 
reads a 12-bit value for each. This module then 
converts these quantities to a two's complement, 
two-byte fixed-point word in engineering units 
for use by the other modules. The discrete bytes 
are unpacked and debounced so that the third 
consecutive one in a string is recognized as a 
state change. 
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The surface position annunciator module tests 
the MAW surface positions against several standard 
configurations and sends output discretes for lamp 
drivers to the MAW panel (HALF, FULL, GNO ROLL 
and FAIREO lights). ' 
The mode logic module generates two discretes 
that are used by the servo command and command 
integrator modules to cause the execution of ini-
tialization routines. The conditions for setting 
one or both discretes are (1) returning from 
backup to the primary system, (2) resetting the 
leading edge brake, and (3) computer power-up. 
The command module generates symmetric command 
input rates to the integrators in the command inte-
grator modul e. 
The preflight test module generates a force 
f~ght.for each of the MAW flaps by commanding a 
b1as 1n one channel only. The &P hardware moni-
t~rs trigger a fault discrete after the threshold 
is exceeded. The LE and backup hardware latches 
are also tested. 
The zaooo communications module e)(Changes 
data between the two FCEUs through the cross-
channel data message for comparison purposes in 
fail ure detection. Each command processor (CP) 
has one zaooo and one zao processor running in 
parallel and communicating with each other throug~ 
two parallel input-output (PIO) devices, as shown 
in Fig. 11. The zaooo processes commands and sen-
sor inputs during each minor cycle and stores the 
developed data in a buffer (M2) that is shared 
with the zao by a handshake procedure through the 
PIOs. The zao copies this buffer into its dedi-
cated memory (Mil while the zaooo also copies this 
buffer into its dedicated memory (M3) for use in 
the next iteration for comparison (by the failure 
detection module) with the data transmitted by the 
other CP. The zaooo then conti nues processi ng ne~' 
input whil e the zao starts feedi ng the transferreci 
data at laO kbits/sec to one channel of a serial 
input-output (SIO) data link for transmission to 
the other CP, while simultaneously receiving data 
transmitted by the other CP through the SIO. 
The format of the transmitted message is de-
rived from the IBM synchronous data link control 
(SOLC) convention. The address field is used 
by the receiver to verify that the message is 
intended for it. Each of the Cycl i c Redundancy 
Characters (CRCs) consists of eight redundancy 
bits generated by the S10 upon transmission and 
verified upon reception. 
The roll module calculates a roll command from 
roll stick and MAW trim inputs. This command is 
added antisymmetrically in the servo command mod-
ule to the symmetric commands of the outboard and, 
mi dspan fl aps. 
The command integrator module integrates the 
rate commands that are input to it from the com-
mand module to form position commands. These 
commands are sent to the servo command module. 
The fail ure detection modul e performs the fol-
lowing functions: (1) compares all analog and 
selected discrete inputs and outputs of the local 
channel with those of the other channel; (2) com-
pares POU differential pressures for each MAW sur-
face of the local channel with those of the other 
channel; (3) compares the left and right LE posi-
tions; (4) compares each MAW flap position with an 
ideal model; and (5) declares and logs failures 
when the comparisons exceed difference thresholds 
or when failure signaling discretes have been set 
by other modules. 
The built-in test module does an ongoing 
check sum test of read-only memory (ROM) while 
waiting for the real-time clock to signal the end 
of a20-msec minor cycle. 
The servo command module combines the position 
commands for all MAW surfaces from the command 
integrator module, the preflight test module. and 
the roll module. The roll module commands are 
summed only with the midspan and outboard flaps. 
The commands are also rate and position limited. 
The output module converts and scales the out-
put variables of the servo command module from 
their internal digital format to a nonlinear OAC 
voltage command to compensate for LVDT linkage. 
Th'l sis done by computing an index from the com-
mand for looking up in a table. 
Flight Software Testing 
The flight software was tested in four phases: 
(1) individual module tests, (2) intermodule tests, 
(3) hot-bench open-loop tests, and (4) integrated 
airplane systems tests. The first two phases 
were done in a non-real-time batch mode that used 
a Z8000 simulator computer; in the second two 
phases the s)ftware was running in the actual 
flight hardware computers. 
The individual modules were coded by a program-
mer from flow charts that were developed from the 
software specification. The software verifier 
developed a flow chart from the code and compared 
this with the original flow chart for similarity. 
The I/O and all possible logic branches were tested 
by adding a loop around the function being tested 
to simulate a real-time execution. The contents 
of pertinent registers were printed for each 
iteration and compared with the expected values. 
The i ntermodul e tests' checked the interface 
between the modules. The output of one module is 
used as an il1put to another. The entire set of 
modules was eventually integrated in this manner. 
The hot-bench testing utilized the actual 
flight computers for the software verification. 7 
The FCEUs were connected to a control panel that 
simulated the aircraft sensor interface. This was 
an open-loop system because the LVDT feedback 
signals were generated from hand pots. The test 
setup is shown in Fig. 12. The control and dis-
play panel and the aircraft sensors were wired to 
a control patch panel. This allowed the signals 
to be opened for checkout and fault testing. The 
MAW servo commands and other signals were hard-
wired to strip chart recorders. Also. a cross-
channel display unit (CCDU) was used to access 
the cross-channel data message. 
The CCDU is microprocessor-based ground sup-
port equipment that was developed specifically for 
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the AFTI/F-ll1 program. The experience of using 
an earlier version of the CCDU on the highly 
maneuverable aircraft technology (HiMAT) pro-
gram8 prompted the decision to develop one for 
this program. The CCDU displays the digital data 
message in an engineering unit format on a CRT 
or sends signals out to 16 DACs for strip chart 
recordings. Basically. the CCDU maps the cross-
channel data message from each computer into its 
own internal memory address. The data are then 
referenced symbolically by the use of a symbol 
table that divides the message into mnemonic names 
and byte lengths. The discrete bytes are unpacked 
for convenient user-oriented data displays. Hard 
copies of any CRT data display can also be made 
on a line printer. The structure of the cross-
channel message is shown in Table 3. 
The CCDU proved to be a valuable tool in 
debugging problems and verifying the software in 
general. Even if a desired byte or bytes were not 
on the cross-channel message, a temporary change 
to the message could be made without making a new 
erasable programmable ROM (EPROM). This change 
would be made by stopping an FCEU from the ter-
minal and entering the addresses of the desired 
bytes (up to 18) in the WINDAT portion of the 
message. After both FCEU messages have been 
modified, they are started again in the real-
time run mode. The default WINDAT addresses 
remain overwritten until the power on the FCEUs 
is cycled. The CCDU operator can redefine data 
lengths in the WINDAT portion of the symbol table 
if necessary and then make any data type changes 
on the CRT displays. 
Flight Qualification 
The flight qualification tests were done on 
the airplane as a total integrated system. These 
tests were done in two phases: (1) testing per-
formed in the hangar and (2) engine run tests. 
The hangar testing used an external hydraulic 
supply system that did not have the flow rate 
capability of the engine pumps. 
Hangar testing 
The test setup for the hangar testing is 
depicted Fig. 13. Three means of testing and 
tr.ouble shooting the FCEUs were utilized: the 
CCDU. breakout boxes. and extender cards. The 
CCDU provided read-only access of each FCEU cross-
channel data message in user display formats. 
This provided a versatile tool during the qualifi-
cation tests and for trouble shooting problems. 
Breakout boxes. required for certain types of 
testing. were inserted between the aircraft I/O 
connections and the FCEUs. Access to the external 
FCEU I/O signals was accomplished through these 
boxes. These boxes were utilized to monitor, 
open, and insert voltages for the failing modes 
and effects testing (FMET) and for trouble-
shooting test modes. Extender cards were used 
as a last resort because they involved opening 
an FCEU box, removing the desired card, and put-
ting it on an extender. 
A detailed test plan procedure9 was devel-
oped for these systems tests. The major tests 
are listed in Table 4. During the process of 
performing these tests a number of hardware and 
software anomalies and design errors were dis-
covered. They were not discovered earlier, be-
cause the FCEUs had never been interfaced with 
a real aircraft system. A number of changes to 
the MAW FCS hardware and software were made to 
correct the anomalies. The piloted simulation 
was used to test any proposed FCEU changes that 
might affect the flying qualities. 
The engine run tests provided a total func-
tional check of the system in the real environment 
of actual hydrCtul ic and e1 ectrica1 power generated 
from the engines. One of the major tests was to 
determine during what conditions the hydrau1 ic 
capability was marginal. Continued stick cycling, 
particularly for single-engine operation, showed 
less than desirable safety margins. Also, fault 
monitors in both the primary and backup MAW FCS 
were set because of the slower flap rates. Fur-
ther hardware and software changes were made to 
improve the flap positions predictor and to dis-
able the downmode logic for critical flap posi-
tions during landing. The hydraulic pump flow 
rate capacities were a1 so upgraded by 10 percent. 
1~ea1-Time Monitoring 
The AFTI/F-lll airplane is extensively instru-
mented. The si!jna1s are recorded in pulse cpde 
modu1 ation (PCM) format to an on-board tape and 
are also te1emetered to a ground station for real-
time monitoring.. A portion of the FCEU cross-
channel message (78 bytes) is interfaced with the 
PCM instrumentation system through a digital data 
interface unit (DDIU) and an airborne instrumenta-
tion computer system (AICS). The DDIUlO receives 
serial data streams at 50 samples/sec from each 
FCEU. The DDIU transmits a 16-bit parallel data 
word composed of 8 bit s of 1 abel (H I byte) and 
8 bits of data (LO byte). The AICS is programmed 
to test for a particular label byte followed by 
its data byte. If the data are coming in too fast 
or if the label bytes are not in ascending order, 
fault flags are issued on the PCM downlink. 
The control room real-time monitoring includes 
the various types of CRT displays (color panel, 
color graphics, and data). A number of strip 
charts are also used. The color panel display 
that shows the MAW status and faults is shown in 
Fig. 14" The color panel is used to display the 
following types of information: 
1. Annunciator lights of the MAW control and 
display panel 
2. Error flags from each FCEU 
3. Indicators that signify "good" data are 
bei n9 r'ecei ved 
4. Certain airplane system status information 
that affects safety of flight 
5. Automatic piloted procedure requests 
depending on particular fault conditions 
6. Wing sweep fault testing 
7. Preflight test counter information 
Latches are created in the control room com-
puter on any faul1:s that wou1 d cause a backup 
downmode or set a status light. The intent ;s 
to determine immediately the cause of any problem. 
An audio cue (three tones) is provided in the con-
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tro1 room whenever the MAW CAUTION light starts to 
flaSh. The fault latch ;s dropped when the pilot 
resets the MAW CAUTION light or when the FCS engi-
neer resets the latch flag using a keyboard in the 
control room. 
The real-time software verification testing 
was done in three phases: (1) external signal 
simulation into the ground station computer; (2) 
generation of real PCM signals by hard-wiring to 
the airplane from the hangar; and (3) actual tele-
metry transmission from the airplane at the engine 
run area for combined systems tests (CST). The 
fi rst phase tested the dri ver 1 ogi c for' the rea 1-
time displays, while the second phase tested the 
PCM interface to the computer. The third phase 
tested the path from the airplane antenna to the 
ground station receiver to the computer interface 
and also tested for any signal interference during 
the data transmission. 
Flight Test Experience 
Most of the MAW FCS signals are available on 
the telemetry downlink, thus providing the capa-
bility of making real-time judgments based on this 
information. A MAW system failure decision tree 
(Fig. 15) was developed to establish procedures in 
the event of MAW problems during flight. Basi-
cally, the pilot wants a Simple procedure for any 
MAW failure indication; the established procedure 
is to brake all the MAW flaps ·in·their current 
position and await instructions from the ground 
station. The flight controls engineer can deter-
mine the nature of the anomaly from the MAW status 
and faults color panel and other displays and then 
advise the pilot to release the brakes and to 
attempt to reset the failure or to land with the 
MAW flaps braked and use only the stabi10ns for 
roll control. 
To date, there have been a total of four 
flights of the AFTI/F-lll MAW aircraft. The MAW 
FCS has been fully ~ngagea for all takeoffs and 
1 andings. Most of the MAW primary FCS functions 
have been demonstrated in flight. Also, the MAW 
backup FCS has been manually engaged at altitude 
for pil o1;ed eval uati ons; it has performed very 
well. All the MAW flaps have been manually braked 
for tail··only roll control evaluation. In this 
configuration the airplane is expected to be rela-
tively easy to land in the absence of other fail-
ures or excessive crosswinds. 
An anomaly occurred after the second fl i ght: 
The airplane failed to pass the automated MAW pre-
flight test program function. Very rapid analysis 
of the problem using the CCDU and breakout boxes 
traced the problem to PDU number 4, which is on 
the right outboard side of the right LE flap (see 
to Fig. 5). Inspection of the PDU revealed that 
it was uncoupled because of a sheared mechanical 
fuse link in the shaft between the motor and the 
gear box. All the LE PDU motor shafts were 
inspected and replaced. 
One of the brakes in the left leading edge 
flap occaSionally fai.1ed to release properly 
during ground test. A workar'ound procedure was 
developed for the first two flights. Both left 
LE brakes were replaced after the second flight. 
During the third flight a hydraulic leak 
occurred in the F-l1l utility system, which 
caused the flight to be terminated early. The 
airplane was landed without incident using the 
primary MAW FCS. 
Concluding Remarks 
The MAW FCS design development grew in scope 
and compl exity from the original concept. The 
foremost consideration was flight safety, which 
required redundancy in both the primary and the 
backup systems. The second design consideration 
was the mission requirements. The lessons learned 
during the development process are outlined below. 
1. The initial MAW design was tested early 
using pilot-in-the-loop simulations before any 
hardware procurements were initiated. This early 
assessment allowed changes to be made during iter-
ations of the design process before concepts were 
frozen and changes became expensive. 
2. The MAW FCS design allowed for hardware 
and software expansion, which was necessary to 
allow for modifications during the development 
and flight qualification process. 
3. The simulation program was coded directly 
from the flight specification document. Errors in 
the software logic were found early and corrected, 
which saved time by eliminating these errors prior 
to the generation of flight software. 
4. The thorough ground testing process proved 
to be an important element in finding and ulti-
mately correcting anomalies so that the airplane 
could be qualified for flight test. 
5. The sensors, commands, fail flags, and 
I/O discretes, which were made accessable to the 
engineers through the cross-channel data message, 
proved very valuable in the FMET, trouble shooting 
test modes, and real-time monitoring during flight 
test. The problems most difficult to solve were 
those that involved data that were not on this bus. 
6. The design of the MAW system made it 
easier to test and troubleshoot the system 
because of easy access to signals on the cross-
channel data bus and hard-wired test points on 
the component cards back plane. 
7. The decision to develop ground testing 
tools, particularly the ceou and breakout boxes, 
before problems occurred saved considerable time 
and money in identifying problems during the 
flight qualif~cation process. 
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8. Adding the OOIU so that the MAW cross-
channel message was available by downlinking 
through the instrumentation system proved to be 
very important. This provided real-time moni-
toring capability of the MAW FCS and the estab-
lishment of piloted procedures based on the data 
analysis from the control room. 
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Table 1 Fault detection 
Primary failures 
Failures not causing downmode 
Any LE failure (system will set LE brakes) 
QC probe (system will set fixed roll gain and TE limit) 
Ideal model (LE and roll flaps) 
Backup fail ures 
Failures causing downmode to backup 
Command (except LE) 
Selected output discretes 
Ideal model (inboard flaps only) 
t.P 
Stick 
Power supply 
Hydraulic pressure <1200 lb/in2 
Computer executive error 
Watch dog timer 
Failures not causing brakes to be set Failures causing any combination of A, B, or INBD brakes to be set 
Aliveness monitor 
QC (system will set fixed roll gain and TE limit) 
Single hydraulics 
Ideal model (flaps HALF/FULL) 
Table 2 Simulation system 
failure inputs 
MAW A flap roll hardover to the left 
MAW A flap roll hardover to the right 
MAW B flap roll hardover to the left 
MAW B flap roll hardover to the right 
Left LE brake set 
QC fai 1 
Single hydraulic system fail 
Inboard flap fairing fault 
Pitch damper fail 
Roll damper fail 
Yaw damper fail 
t.3° LE differential fail 
A backup reset monitor 
B backup reset monitor 
INBD backup reset monitor 
Engine fail 
Downmode to backup 
IDENT faul t (roll reversal) 
Model fault threshold 
9 
Valve current 
Position limit 
Power supply 
Sti ck 
Ideal model (flaps RETRACT) 
Table 3 Cross-channel data message 
Signals 
FLAG 
ADDRESS 
CONTROL 
FRAME COUNT 
ERROR FLAGS 
INPUT DISCRETES 
OUTPUT DISCRETES 
D/A OUTPUTS 
WINDAT 
ANALOG INPUTS 
Length, bytes 
1 
1 
1 
4 
10 
14 
8 
24 
18 
94 
Table 4 Qualification tests 
Test prerequisites 
Continuity check of MAW FCS wiring 
Voltage check of MAW FCS wiring 
Test equipment calibration 
Fl ap cal ibration 
MAW flight control system tests 
Control and display panel lamp checks 
Backup FCS validation 
Primary-Backup transitions 
MAW brake engagements 
PDU bypass, block, brake 
Hydraulic bypass interlock 
MAW electrical system tests 
MAI4 battery operation time 
Reduced voltage operation 
Flap switch effects on the basic F-111 FCS 
Failure modes and effects testing 
Hydraul ic 
El ectri ca 1 
Brake 
LE differenti al 
Position 
l'lP 
Input disc rete 
Output disc rete 
Hysteresi s tests 
Dynami c response test s 
DDIU tests 
Piloted evaluations 
Engine runs 
Combined system tests 
ECN 33205-011 
Fig. 1 AFTI/F-lll aircraft. 
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TACT/F-111 
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Fig. 2 ltal'iabZe-aambel' 8Ul'faae mOlJement. 
Actuator 
Midspan 
Fig. J AFTIIF~lll fZap actuation system. 
QC side 
Interfaces With 
eXls"ng electrical 
and hYdraulic 
systems 
Single-segment 
variable-camber 
leading edge 
system 
Existing 
F·111AI 
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MAW 
electronic 
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Control 
panel 
Three-segment 
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system 
Fig. 4 AF7'I/F-lll Pl'inaipal modifiaations. 
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LVDT - 2 
AP -2 
LEFTLE 
LVDT-2 
AP -2 
RIGHTLE 
LEFTOlJTBD LEFT MID LEFTINBD RIGHTINBD RIGHT MID RIGHTOUlBD 
NOTES: (1) The signal flow is a two-way path: (2) No. - PDU number 
from FCEU - commands (3) P - primary hydraulics 
to FCEU - AP, LVDTs U - utility hydraulics 
Fig. 5 System al'chiteatul'e of digital pl'iTTlll'Y FeS. 
~~~ _________ LE_FT __ LE __________ ~HH~:~ R1~:~ __________ R_'G_HT __ LE __________ ~Rd~:~ 
LEFTOlJTBD LEFT MID LEFTINBD RIGHTINBD RIGHT MID RIGHTOUlBD 
NOTES: (1) The signal flow is a two-way path: (2) No.· PDU number 
from FCEU - commands (3) P - primary hydraulics 
to FCEU - AP, LVDTs U - utility hydraulics 
Fig. 6 System al'chiteatul'e of analog backup FeS. 
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Fig. 8 simpLified bLock diagram of MAW commands. Acronyms are defined in the NomencLature section. 
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. ~} 
Fig. 10 SoftWtll'e moduLe st%'UctUl'e. 
Fig. 11 FCEU communication 
configuration. 
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Fig. 12 Hot-bench testing setup. 
PRINTER 
xx xx xx CCDU 
xx xx xx 
Fig. 13 AircPaft quaZification testing setup. 
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Fig. 14 MAW status and fauZts eoZor paneZ. 
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